This research paper examines how policymakers have addressed the relationship between paramilitary groups and organised crime in societies transitioning from war to peace. It argues that policymakers have responded through a spectrum of approaches and goes on to outline some of the major policy challenges and lessons associated with them, including political fragmentation, perverse incentives and policy siloes. It concludes with recommendations for mitigating these challenges.

Prof Jonathan Goodhand (SOAS)

Dr Kota Watanabe (NYU Wagner)

Dr Patrick Meehan (University of Manchester)

June 2026

This Briefing Note examines how the paramilitary-organised crime nexus shapes war-to-peace transitions. It recognises that paramilitaries often retain significant autonomy, economic power, and transnational connections and that their exclusion or mismanagement in peace-processes can create veto players, entrench violence and undermine post-war governance. The researchers calls for policymakers to analyse the ‘holding power’ of paramilitaries, including their economic networks, local embeddedness and external backers, with their inclusion in negotiations conditional, realistic and enforceable, linked to disarmament, justice and development strategies, and calibrated to paramilitary structures and state capacity.

Prof Jonathan Goodhand (SOAS, University of London)

Dr Patrick Meehan (University of Manchester)

June 2026

Photo credit: Tom Bastin

This Briefing Note examines policy implications of the paramilitary–organised crime nexus for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR) programmes in post-war transitions. Paramilitaries’ close ties to state institutions, political elites and illicit economies mean they are frequently shielded from accountability and excluded from disarmament processes designed for rebel groups. It show how different policy approaches shape DDR/SSR outcomes and demonstrates that paramilitarism should be treated as a governance challenge , requiring governance responses and approaches that reduce arm while gradually reshaping the security environment.

Prof Jonathan Goodhand (SOAS, University of London)

Dr Patrick Meehan (University of Manchester)

June 2026

Paramilitary–organised crime networks frequently persist after peace agreements, and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR) processes, requiring development actors to adopt long-term, conflict‑sensitive approaches rather than assuming that stabilisation efforts alone will weaken these systems.

This Briefing Note draws out five implications, that development programming must be, 1) conflict-sensitive and attentive to distributional impacts, 2) invest in harm reduction and community level violence-mitigation, 3) create systemic pathways out of paramilitarism, 4) integrate marginalised regions and communities, and 5) tackle the gendered structures of criminalised local orders.

Prof Jonathan Goodhand (SOAS, University of London)

Dr Patrick Meehan (University of Manchester)

June 2026

Paramilitary actors engaged in organised crime pose distinctive challenges in war‑to‑peace transitions as their activities are deeply embedded in political, territorial and governance systems rather than being driven solely by profit. Their coercive power, links to elites and access to state protection allow them to consolidate control over illicit markets, reinforcing their political influence and undermining long‑term peacebuilding and state legitimacy. This Note demonstrates that response strategies should integrate organised crime analysis in to conflict and governance assessments, treat paramilitary criminality as a political problem, account for state complicity, patronage and incentives, and go beyond national borders.

Prof Jonathan Goodhand (SOAS, University of London)

Dr Patrick Meehan (University of Manchester)

June 2026

Photo credit: Diego Sideburns

Paramilitary violence and organised crime are a growing and often connected phenomenon in many countries affected by state fragility and post-war transitions. Yet there is a major gap in understanding of and responses to addressing this relationship in peacebuilding and post-war efforts. This Briefing Note offers a diagnostic and planning tool that can be used to map key features of paramilitary actors, identify key the political and economic incentives sustaining their involvement in organised crime, and anticipate the likely consequences of different policy choices. This framework, designed to be flexible and adaptive across contexts, can help policymakers and practitioners to move beyond template responses towards strategies grounded in local power dynamics and political realities.

Prof Jonathan Goodhand (SOAS University of London)

Dr Patrick Meehan (University of Manchester)

June 2026

Photo credit: Rob Waddington

This Case Study argues that Colombia’s efforts to address paramilitarism have achieved only partial and temporary gains because policy focused too narrowly on demobilising fighters rather than dismantling the wider political, economic and governance structures that sustained paramilitary power. It highlights major weaknesses in the process, including weak action against paramilitary networks and assets, inadequate reintegration, and failure to address underlying structural drivers. Negotiations with paramilitary actors requires transparency, formal structures and accountability, whilst DDR programmes need to be combined with broader strategies to dismantle political-criminal networks, extend legitimate governance and create long-term economic alternatives.

Dr Andrew Thomson (Queen’s University)

June 2026

This Case Study argues that Northern Ireland’s experience shows both the value and limits of treating paramilitarism as a wider social and developmental problem rather than only a policing issue. The paper examines the Northern Ireland Executive’s Tackling Paramilitarism, Organised Crime and Criminality Programme, highlighting its ‘whole of system, whole of government’ approach, which combines law enforcement with efforts to address the structural conditions that sustain paramilitary influence. It’s public health-style model has contributed to some positive outcomes, but progress remains uneven and difficult to measure. Integrated, cross-departmental and community-based approaches can help reduce paramilitary harm and legitimacy but are unlikely on their own to secure disbandment. Durable progress also requires political stability, stronger coordination, and credible exit routes and dismantling mechanisms for individuals and organisations still embedded in paramilitary structures.

Dr Andrew Thomson (Queen’s University)

June 2026

This Case Study argues that militias and border guard forces in Myanmar are not simply criminal actors but deeply embedded components of the Myanmar military’s wider system of borderland governance. The paper highlights how this paramilitary–organised crime nexus has expanded in Myanmar’s borderlands, especially since the 2021 coup, explaining why responses have had limited impact. Implications are that durable solutions for cannot rely on the Myanmar military to dismantle its own allies, and instead responses must recognise the structural role of militias, focus on financial and criminal networks, mitigate harms and engage seriously with the opportunities and limitations of working with regional powers.

Dr Patrick Meehan (University of Manchester)

July 2026

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has significantly reconfigured organised crime across Ukraine and neighbouring regions. Rather than simply disrupting illicit networks, the war and resulting sanctions have displaced and reshaped them. The most visible changes have occurred in the drugs market. Synthetic drug production has increasingly relocated to Kazakhstan, while trafficking routes for heroin and cocaine have shifted towards Belarus, Central Asia and the Balkans.

Dr Alexander Kupatadze (Kings College London)

Erica Marat (NDU)

April 2026

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has reconfigured organised crime, displacing and transforming networks across regions. Crime has grown in both neighbouring states and Russia itself, with new actors, routes and cyber‑enabled methods emerging. War and sanctions act as systemic shocks, expanding illicit markets rather than suppressing them and demanding multi‑level policy responses.

Dr Alexander Kupatadze (Kings College London)

Erica Marat (NDU)

March 2026