Addressing the Paramilitary–Organised Crime Nexus in War-to-Peace Transitions: Implications for Addressing Organised Crime
June 2026
Briefing Note 47
Prof. Jonathan Goodhand (SOAS, University of London)
Dr. Patrick Meehan (University of Manchester)
SOC ACE Project: Para-statal armed groups, illicit economies and organised crime
Picture credit: Diego Sideburns
PUBLICATION SUMMARY
This briefing note forms part of a series of publications generated through the Policy Lab convened by Goodhand and Meehan, and supported by SOC ACE, to explore new approaches to addressing the paramilitary-organised crime nexus and how better to integrate responses.
Paramilitary actors engaged in organised crime pose distinctive challenges in war‑to‑peace transitions because their activities are deeply embedded in political, territorial and governance systems rather than being driven solely by profit. Their coercive power, links to elites and access to state protection allow them to consolidate control over illicit markets, reinforcing their political influence and undermining long‑term peacebuilding and state legitimacy.
Policy responses fall into four broad approaches – avoidance, co‑option, criminalisation and transformation – each carrying different assumptions, trade‑offs and risks. Avoidance may stabilise transitions but entrenches criminal governance; co‑option can reduce violence yet normalises illicit authority; enforcement‑led criminalisation may disrupt revenues but risks backlash; and long-term transformation requires addressing the structural drivers sustaining paramilitary power.
Effective strategies require integrating organised crime analysis into conflict and governance assessments, improving understanding of political–criminal networks and breaking down policy silos. Policymakers should treat paramilitary criminality as a political problem that shapes and is shaped by political settlements, necessitating politically informed, context‑specific interventions. Given the close ties between paramilitaries and the state, interventions must account for state complicity, patronage and incentives, supporting reform‑minded actors where possible. Finally, because illicit markets are regional and transnational, responses must extend beyond national borders, targeting financial flows, supply chains and cross‑border enablers that sustain paramilitary‑linked organised crime.
RELATED PUBLICATIONS
Read the full series of publications from Jonathan Goodhand and Patrick Meehan’s Policy Lab on ‘Addressing the Paramilitary-Organised Crime Nexus in War-to-Peace Transitions’.
Paramilitaries and Organised Crime in War-to-Peace Transitions: Policy Challenges and
Responses
How have policymakers sought to address the paramilitary-organised crime nexus, what are the challenges and what are the lessons? Read here…
Paramilitary-Organised Crime Nexus: A framework for policymakers
A framework for assessing policy responses to the paramilitary-organised crime nexus from Goodhand and Meehan. Read here…
Paramilitary-Organised Crime Nexus: Implications for supporting peace processes
How does the paramilitary–organised crime nexus shape war‑to‑peace transitions, and what are the implications for peace process support? Read here…
Paramilitary-Organised Crime Nexus: Implications for DDR and SSR Programmes
DDR/SSR in paramilitary-affected contexts requires tailored strategies, improved intelligence & analysis, conditionality for participation, and government coordination. Read here…
Paramilitary-Organised Crime Nexus: Implications for Development Programming
What should development actors consider when programming to address paramilitary-organised crime nexus in war-to-peace transitions? Read here…
Undertaking Political Economy Analysis of the Paramilitary–Organised Crime Nexus
A practical tool to guide policymakers and practitioners in undertaking political economy analysis of the paramilitary-organised crime nexus. Read here…
Colombia Case Study: Political Negotiations with Paramilitary ‘Allies’
Negotiations with paramilitaries requires transparency, formal structures and accountability. DDR should be combined with strategies to dismantle political-criminal networks, extend governance and create economic alternatives. Read here…
N. Ireland Case Study: A ‘Public Health’ Approach to the Paramilitary-Organised Crime Nexus
Integrated, cross-department, community-based approaches can help reduce paramilitary harm and legitimacy but are unlikely to secure disbandment on their own. Read here…
Myanmar Case Study: The Paramilitary-Organised Crime Nexus in Borderlands
Responses must recognise the structural role of militias, focus on financial and criminal networks, mitigate harms and engage seriously with the opportunities and limitations of working with regional powers. Read here…
Read publications from Jonathan Goodhand and Patrick Meehan from their overarching research project, Parastatal Armed Groups, Illicit Economies and Organised Crime.
Coercive Brokerage: The Paramilitary-Organized Crime Nexus in Borderlands and Frontiers
Explores the nexus between paramilitaries, illicit economies and organised crime, advancing a conceptual framework for analysing in borderland and frontier regions. Read here….
Coercive Brokerage: Paramilitaries, Illicit Economies and Organised Crime in the Frontiers of Afghanistan, Colombia
Examines the nexus between paramilitaries, illicit economies and organised crime through case studies of Afghanistan, Myanmar and Colombia borderlands. Read here…