Addressing the Paramilitary–Organised Crime Nexus in War-To-Peace Transitions: Implications for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration and Security Sector Reform Programmes

June 2026

Briefing Note 45

Professor Jonathan Goodhand (SOAS, University of London)

Dr Patrick Meehan (University of Manchester)

SOC ACE Project: Para-statal armed groups, illicit economies and organised crime


PUBLICATION SUMMARY

This briefing note forms part of a series of publications generated through the Policy Lab convened by Goodhand and Meehan, and supported by SOC ACE, to explore new approaches to addressing the paramilitary-organised crime nexus and how better to integrate responses.

This Briefing Note examines the implications of the paramilitary–organised crime nexus for policymakers supporting disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR) programmes in post-war transitions. Paramilitaries often remain central actors in post‑war violence, yet DDR and SSR programmes routinely struggle to address them. Their close ties to state institutions, political elites and illicit economies mean they are frequently shielded from accountability and excluded from disarmament processes designed for rebel groups.

These groups act as intermediaries between the central state and its periphery, bridging licit and illicit economies, and creating incentives for governments to retain rather than dismantle them. Even when paramilitary-focused DDR programmes are attempted, as in Colombia, successor groups often re-emerge because structural drivers of insecurity and organised crime remain unresolved.

The Briefing Note outlines four policy approaches – avoidance, co-option, criminalisation and transformation – and shows how each shapes DDR/SSR outcomes. Avoidance may preserve short‑term stability, but it entrenches criminal governance. Co‑option can reduce immediate violence, but it embeds paramilitary influence within state institutions. Criminalisation can disrupt networks, but it risks backlash, fragmentation and destabilisation. Transformative approaches offer the most sustainable results, but they require political settlement, resources and long-term commitment.

Effective DDR/SSR in paramilitary-affected contexts requires tailored strategies, improved intelligence and analysis, clear conditionalities for participation, and coordination across local, national and international levels. Ultimately, paramilitarism must be treated as a governance challenge requiring accountable security institutions, community trust-building, and approaches that reduce harm while gradually reshaping the security environment.


RELATED PUBLICATIONS

Read the full series of publications from Jonathan Goodhand and Patrick Meehan’s Policy Lab on ‘Addressing the Paramilitary-Organised Crime Nexus in War-to-Peace Transitions’.

Paramilitaries and Organised Crime in War-to-Peace Transitions: Policy Challenges and 

Responses

How have policymakers sought to address the paramilitary-organised crime nexus, what are the challenges and what are the lessons? Read here…

Paramilitary-Organised Crime Nexus: A framework for policymakers

A framework for assessing policy responses to the paramilitary-organised crime nexus from Goodhand and Meehan. Read here…

Paramilitary-Organised Crime Nexus: Implications for supporting peace processes

How does the paramilitary–organised crime nexus shape war‑to‑peace transitions, and what are the implications for peace process support? Read here…

Paramilitary-Organised Crime Nexus: Implications for Development Programming

What should development actors consider when programming to address paramilitary-organised crime nexus in war-to-peace transitions? Read here…

Paramilitary-Organised Crime Nexus: Implications for Addressing Organised Crime

How to address organised crime when paramilitary criminal activities are embedded in political, territorial and governance systems rather than being solely profit-driven? Read here…

Undertaking Political Economy Analysis of the Paramilitary–Organised Crime Nexus

A practical tool to guide policymakers and practitioners in undertaking political economy analysis of the paramilitary-organised crime nexus. Read here…

Colombia Case Study: Political Negotiations with Paramilitary ‘Allies’

Negotiations with paramilitaries requires transparency, formal structures and accountability. DDR should be combined with strategies to dismantle political-criminal networks, extend governance and create economic alternatives. Read here…

N. Ireland Case Study: A ‘Public Health’ Approach to the Paramilitary-Organised Crime Nexus

Integrated, cross-department, community-based approaches can help reduce paramilitary harm and legitimacy but are unlikely to secure disbandment on their own. Read here…

Myanmar Case Study: The Paramilitary-Organised Crime Nexus in Borderlands

Responses must recognise the structural role of militias, focus on financial and criminal networks, mitigate harms and engage seriously with the opportunities and limitations of working with regional powers. Read here…

Read publications from Jonathan Goodhand and Patrick Meehan from their overarching research project, Parastatal Armed Groups, Illicit Economies and Organised Crime.

Coercive Brokerage: The Paramilitary-Organized Crime Nexus in Borderlands and Frontiers

Explores the nexus between paramilitaries, illicit economies and organised crime, advancing a conceptual framework for analysing in borderland and frontier regions. Read here….

Coercive Brokerage: Paramilitaries, Illicit Economies and Organised Crime in the Frontiers of Afghanistan, Colombia

Examines the nexus between paramilitaries, illicit economies and organised crime through case studies of Afghanistan, Myanmar and Colombia borderlands. Read here…

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