The paramilitary–organised crime nexus represents a persistent and under-addressed challenge in war-to-peace transitions. Paramilitaries are not residual actors that fade away with the end of large-scale conflict; rather, they often adapt, entrench themselves in criminalised peace economies, and continue to shape governance, security and livelihoods at local, national and transnational levels. Policy responses that treat paramilitaries as either purely criminal actors or temporary security partners risk misunderstanding their durability, social embeddedness and political significance.

This Briefing Note provides a typology for assessing policy responses to the paramilitary-organised crime nexus and sets out guidance on how to strengthen understanding of and engagement with the nexus for improved policy outcomes.

Prof. Jonathan Goodhand (SOAS, University of London)

Dr Patrick Meehan (University of Manchester)

June 2026

This Case Study argues that Colombia’s efforts to address paramilitarism have achieved only partial and temporary gains because policy focused too narrowly on demobilising fighters rather than dismantling the wider political, economic and governance structures that sustained paramilitary power. It highlights major weaknesses in the process, including weak action against paramilitary networks and assets, inadequate reintegration, and failure to address underlying structural drivers. Negotiations with paramilitary actors requires transparency, formal structures and accountability, whilst DDR programmes need to be combined with broader strategies to dismantle political-criminal networks, extend legitimate governance and create long-term economic alternatives.

Dr Andrew Thomson (Queen’s University)

June 2026