Illicit Outsourcing: Domain, Politics and the Limits of Operational Responses in State–Crime Relationships

Type: Journal Article

9 Jul

Written By Lyndsey Hand

June 2026

The RUSI Journal, 171(4), 68–82

Professor Heather Marquette (University of Birmingham)

Matthew Redhead (RUSI)

SOC ACE Project: State Threats: Understanding and responding to the new landscape of hostile state activity

PUBLICATION SUMMARY

This article examines the growing use of criminal actors by states to achieve political and strategic objectives. The authors argue that while collaboration between states and organised crime is not new, its scale, diversity and operational importance have increased significantly in recent decades.

The article develops a framework for analysing state–crime relationships across four areas: criminals as covert operatives, criminals as professional service providers, crime as a weapon, and crime as a source of covert funding. Examples include, among others, Russia’s use of criminals for sabotage and intelligence operations, Iran’s employment of criminal proxies for transnational repression, North Korea’s reliance on cybercrime and illicit finance, and China’s selective engagement with criminal networks for influence and repression activities.

A central argument is that the nature of state–crime relationships varies according to the operational domain rather than simply the state involved. The authors adapt Tim Maurer’s concepts of delegation, orchestration and sanctioned support to show how different forms of control and detachment operate across cyber, financial, migration and physical violence domains.

Drawing on lessons from stabilisation and counterinsurgency, the article argues that purely operational responses, such as arrests, sanctions or law-enforcement disruption, are often insufficient. Criminal networks are embedded within broader political economy, meaning that disrupting individual actors rarely addresses the underlying incentives and structures that sustain these relationships.

The authors conclude that effective responses require a deeper understanding of political economy and stronger coordination among intelligence, law enforcement, sanctions enforcement, foreign policy and development actors. They recommend creating dedicated cross-government units focused on state–crime interactions and developing comparative databases to improve evidence and analysis. Ultimately, the article highlights the need for integrated, politically informed strategies to counter increasingly sophisticated forms of illicit state outsourcing.

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