This paper categorises the practices used by Russian Kremlin-connected actors to advance Russian illicit financial flows (IFF) and depicts them, as well as their relationships to one another and to IFF in a novel framework. It argues that conclusively identifying and tracing IFF in authoritarian environments is very difficult due to the politicised nature of authoritarian legal systems and the inevitable data gaps. Our framework seeks to remedy these challenges by mapping malign practices, enacted by Russian actors in collaboration with elite overseas partners to create conditions friendly to Russian IFF, across three vectors: 1) political activities, 2) media activities and 3) political violence. We argue that the deployment of these practices is deeply connected to Russian foreign policy objectives, which are built in part on informal and patronal relationships with domestic elites. Thus, the principal actors in Russian foreign policymaking and -doing are not state institutions but elites, intermediaries, private companies, and organised crime groups.

Catherine Owen, Tena Prelec & Tom Mayne

May 2022

Strategies to counter serious organised crime (SOC) and corruption typically include an awareness-raising or messaging element. The hope is that this will engender both intolerance of corruption and SOC as well as public support for non-corrupt leaders and anti-SOC policies. A growing body of research, however, suggests that raising awareness of ‘social bads’ like organised crime and corruption may risk doing more harm than good. This research therefore aims to examine what effect a range of messaging strategies would have in Albania, a country that struggles with the malign effects of both corruption and SOC. It is therefore imperative to develop effective anti-SOC and anti-corruption strategies. The research tests the effect of different kinds of anti-SOC and anti-corruption messages in Albania, reporting on a nationally representative sample of 3,003 Albanian adults. The research finds similar negative impacts of messaging campaigns, considering whether the best way forward is to design new kinds of messages, or to move away from messaging campaigns in favour of deeper and more sustained forms of engagement. In either case, the path ahead should involve rigorous testing in order to avoid unintended consequences and ensure that investments are well spent.

Nic Cheeseman & Caryn Peiffer

May 2022

This short evidence review paper, written before February 2022, looks at the links between corruption, crime and conflict in eastern Ukraine. As well as explaining the background to the conflict in eastern Ukraine (at the time of writing), the paper also looks at the pre-conflict situation with regard to organised crime and corruption and how organised crime and corruption play a role in, and have been impacted by, the conflict.

Iffat Idris

May 2022

This research reviews existing evidence on the use and impact of targeted sanctions to disrupt organised criminal activity. It focuses on two case studies, Colombia and Libya, in differing regions of the world and with different exposure to organised crime-focused sanctions. The research analyses organised crime-related sanctions data, examines the current state of knowledge relating to the implementation and impact of these sanctions, and draws on the two case studies to identify a number of factors that influence the effectiveness of organised crime-focused sanctions. While the research focuses on other jurisdictions with track records of using sanctions to disrupt organised crime, implications for the UK are also explored, with a view to informing UK policy thinking on the potential establishment of an organised crime-focused sanctions regime.

Cathy Heinlein, Sasha Erskine, Elijah Glantz & Tom Keatinge

May 2022

This briefing note looks at the links between (lack of) political will and serious organised crime (SOC) and corruption. It suggests a new way to better understand political will and why a lack of political will may appear to exist. The lens of political want, political can and political must introduced here, based on Malena’s (2009) work on ‘getting from political won’t to political will’, can help those tasked with developing counter-SOC and anti-corruption strategies and interventions to move beyond seeing political will as a barrier, in order to better develop more politically and technically feasible reforms and approaches.

Heather Marquette

May 2022

This evidence review explores the literature on political will in relation to organised crime, kleptocracy, illicit finance, sanctions, trafficking and COVID-19. Findings demonstrate the importance of political will for effectively tackling SOC, illicit finance and transnational corruption, but also why it is so challenging to find political will, measure it and create demand for it.

Iffat Idris

May 2022