New research highlights the Black Sea Trade Networks Sustaining Russia’s War in Ukraine and the Risks to European Security
A new research paper by Olivia Allison (University of Exeter) and Joshua Coyle highlights the extensive scale of illicit trade across the Black Sea that both originates from and sustains Russia’s war against Ukraine, as well as its continued occupation of Ukrainian territory. The report documents the movement of sanctioned goods used by the Russian military, the export of commodities looted from occupied areas of Ukraine - including grain, coal, metal and kaolin clay - and the operation of a large “shadow fleet” transporting Russian oil above the G7 price cap.
According to the research, hundreds of private companies are involved in facilitating this trade. While many appear commercially independent, the authors argue that their activities align closely with Kremlin objectives and generate significant financial benefits for the Russian state. Much of this activity is already subject to UK, EU and wider G7 sanctions, yet it continues openly due to enforcement gaps and the fact that such trade is both legal and actively encouraged within Russia.
The paper further warns that these networks extend into Europe and the UK through shipping, finance, legal services, manufacturing and complex corporate ownership structures. Although some of the identified links may not directly breach existing sanctions, they create economic and security vulnerabilities by enabling profits linked to Russia’s war effort and occupation of Ukrainian territory.
The authors suggest that this trade is not a by-product of the war in Ukraine; it is an essential part of Russia’s hybrid war to disrupt Ukrainian, European and UK institutions, therefore posing a geoeconomic threat and state threat against the UK, other European countries and their allies, requiring stronger measures to identify, disrupt and restrict the networks facilitating these activities.
To address these challenges, the report sets out a series of recommendations aimed at disrupting the infrastructure that enables Russian war-related illicit trade. These include stronger sanctions enforcement, expanded restrictions on ports, logistics operators and vessels linked to occupied Ukrainian territories, and greater scrutiny of the individuals, companies and ownership structures profiting from these activities.
The authors also urge closer coordination between the UK, EU and US to align sanctions regimes and close enforcement gaps. In addition, they recommend enhanced due diligence by banks, shipping companies and professional service providers, including more detailed investigations into vessel ownership, trade routes and Russia-linked commercial relationships. Such measures, they argue, would help identify and prevent sanctions evasion while reducing the flow of resources that support Russia’s occupation of Ukraine.
Read the full research paper and accompanying briefing note on the SOC ACE publication page and find other publications on Russia’s use of illicit finance in its foreign policy and its occupation of Ukrainian territories on the Illicit finance and Russian foreign policy: new dynamics and linkages project page.