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Militarised Approaches to Serious and Organised Crime: Approaches and Policy Implications

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About the author

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Summary

This annotated bibliography includes research and evidence on militarised approaches to combating serious and organised crime (SOC) in various contexts. Militarised approaches involve using military forces or methods to deter and disrupt SOC groups. These approaches have been employed in states facing high levels of violence, fragile and conflict-affected contexts, post-conflict settings, and against threats like piracy and wildlife crime.

The research finds that the evidence on the effectiveness of militarised approaches is largely negative. While there are a range of militarised approaches, applied in a variety of contexts, most papers nevertheless agree that military force, or military techniques, can only address one facet of SOC at best, and need to be linked with a range of other measures such as policing, rule of law interventions and economic interventions, to effectively combat SOC. As well as drawing resources away from these other measures, militarised approaches have also been found to have a number of direct and indirect negative effects, such as human rights abuses, increases in violence and undermining the rule of law.

The papers studied highlight the importance of understanding the range of direct and indirect effects that militarised approaches can have: on targeted SOC groups, on rival SOC groups, on levels of violence, on the economic and political drivers of crime, on the rule of law and policing capacity, on democratic norms, on human security, and on public perceptions. Quantitative and qualitative evidence highlights the effects of such approaches on crime, violence, public trust, and other indicators in specific contexts.

While policymakers and the public often support militarised approaches, the academic and policy literature generally offers a negative perspective. The diverse forms of militarisation and contexts in which they are used mean there is relatively little systematic evidence, but the evidence from individual contexts does not support the use of militarised approaches. The literature suggests that militarised approaches can only address some aspects of SOC and have inherent problems, both normatively and practically.

Introduction and approach

A range of militarised approaches have been employed to tackle serious and organised crime (SOC) in a variety of contexts, geographies and income levels. In states where levels of violence are similar to those seen in formal conflicts, militarised approaches have been deployed to tackle violent SOC groups and win back territory for the state. Militarised approaches have also been used in fragile and conflict-affected contexts, post-conflict settings where gang violence is significant, and against the threats of piracy and wildlife crime.

While policymakers and publics have shown enthusiasm for such approaches, the academic and policy literature largely takes a negative view. There is relatively little systematic evidence on the issue, partly as a result of the variety of forms of militarisation and contexts to which they are applied. Nevertheless, the literature widely acknowledges that militarised approaches can only address some facets of SOC, at best. Many also point to inherent problems in using armed force to tackle crime on both normative and practical grounds. There is also quantitative and qualitative evidence of the effects of militarised approaches on crime, levels of violence, public trust and other indicators in particular contexts.

This annotated bibliography gathers research and evidence on militarised approaches to serious and organised crime.¹ Militarised approaches are characterised by the use of the military to deter and disrupt organised crime, or the use of military methods by the police or other civilian bodies. Militarised approaches have been used to combat serious and organised crime (SOC) in many contexts, as they are often seen by policymakers and publics as necessary in the face of well-armed and influential SOC groups. However, the literature reviewed suggests that such approaches have also been found to increase levels of violence, cause human rights abuses, lead to corruption, undermine policing and to distract from long-term solutions to crime.

Searches were made through electronic search engines such as Google Scholar and the websites of relevant international organisations. Search terms were developed based on the research area, as well as relevant country contexts and issues identified by the author. References from other publications and suggestions from other authors were used to supplement these findings. It is a rapid review and is not intended to be exhaustive; however, effort has been made to include sources that are likely to be broadly representative of the wider body of literature.

The paper includes evidence from peer-reviewed academic journals, think tanks and policymakers. Entries have been arranged by theme, with headings on law, policy and definitions, followed by different problems to which militarised approaches have been

¹ The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime has provided an internationally shared definition of an organised criminal group as 'a group of three or more persons existing over a period of time acting in concert with the aim of committing crimes for financial or material benefit'.
<https://www.europol.europa.eu/socta/2017/defining-serious-and-organised-crime.html>

applied: the stabilisation of conflict or post-conflict settings, wildlife crime, piracy, and drug crime. While the search has not been systematic, an attempt has been made to include examples from different relevant geographies, on different forms of militarisation, on different forms of serious and organised crime, and using different methodologies. The review does not seek to weigh or synthesise the body of evidence as a whole.

The papers and reports include several processes that may be termed militarisation. Some focus on the distinction between action undertaken by military forces (or heavily armed police) and civilian policing. Such distinctions raise issues of aims (taking territory and killing enemies rather than criminal detection and prosecution), as well as methods, such as the degree of force used and the use of legal process. Other features of militarisation include ‘war talk’, securitisation, or the use of military processes or technologies developed by the military. Macías and Zarkin (2019), for example, distinguish between militarised police, paramilitary police, and constabularised militaries. Some distinguish securitisation – including intelligence gathering and surveillance – from militarisation, whereas others consider it an aspect of militarisation. Jespersen (2018) understands militarised approaches as ‘one end of a spectrum that extends to people-centred development approaches’.

Several authors included in the bibliography start from the view that the use of force can only be one facet of combating serious and organised crime. Indeed, many criticisms in this bibliography centre on the exclusive or disproportionate focus on military methods at the expense of others, rather than on the use of the military, or military force, per se. Several papers find that military force can be useful, or even necessary, when part of a well-targeted strategy, working alongside other short- and long-term methods. However, in several contexts, the use of increased force against SOC is shown to lead to more violence via escalation or displacement. It can also result in extra-judicial killings and ‘civilian’ deaths, weakening the rule of law.

Policy analysis suggests that militarised approaches are usually driven by popular support, the urgency of the problem, perceived efficacy and institutional interests. They may also be shaped by learning from other contexts. Several sources also seek to understand the development of militarised polices with respect to other facets of domestic and foreign policy, such as policing and development, and in relation to forms of governance. Some address the role of international actors, such as US support to Latin American militaries, or the European Union in the Sahel. Domestic and international law are also considered as shapers of and potential restraints on militarised policies.

The papers and reports found use a variety of measures to assess both direct and indirect effects of militarised approaches. These include levels of violence and deaths, human rights abuses, prosecutions and reductions in a particular crime. Analysis of incidents of violence is typically used to show the spatial effect of militarised approaches. In conflict or post-conflict settings, the effects of militarised approaches to SOC are often analysed in relation to political economies of conflict and intervention. Reflecting some of the wider literature on SOC and its relationship to broader socioeconomic and political systems, many sources focus on the effects of militarised approaches on governance, corruption, livelihoods and public trust. Most papers used qualitative methodologies to provide case studies of militarised approaches or policy development.

The literature surveyed here assesses militarised approaches used in the ‘war on drugs’ in Latin America; in post-conflict and fragile states, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Central African Republic; against wildlife crime in Africa; and against pirates off Somalia. Much of the literature takes the form of case studies of particular deployments or policies. There are also examples of comparative approaches (for example, Duffy et al., 2019; Reitano et al., 2018). The contexts in which militarised approaches are deployed vary significantly.² In conflict and post-conflict situations, peacekeeping forces may already have been deployed, and then take on a role against SOC. In states at peace, militarisation may mean police being ‘militarised’ or the military being deployed in place of, or alongside, police. However, in some states, such as Mexico, the level of violence and lack of state control creates situations similar to conflicts.

There are some geographical patterns in the papers found. They show that militarised approaches are prevalent in the ‘war on drugs’ in Latin America, with several states using military force to combat high levels of violence and territorial control. These are often supported by US funding and training. Militarised methods have also been used in response to drug crime in Thailand and the Philippines in recent years. By contrast, the papers describing militarised approaches in African contexts are focused on peacekeeping forces in conflict-affected, post-conflict or fragile states where the militarised response to SOC is part of a broader process. Africa also sees militarised approaches to tackling wildlife crime, although the intensity of such approaches is often much lower. Naval force has been used against pirates off Somalia, and refugee boats in the Mediterranean.

Although the purpose of this annotated bibliography is not to provide an in-depth synthesis of this body of literature, it is possible to pull out some key points that emerge from the review.

- Militarised approaches to serious and organised crime have been found to be popular among policymakers and the public, and academics have analysed the processes by which militarisation policy develops. However, there is very limited evidence of their efficacy, and many studies point to failures or drawbacks of such approaches.
- It is important to distinguish different forms of militarisation, including by such indicators as how far they are constrained by legal norms, how far they seek to gain the consent of citizens, and the nature of the relationship between militarised units and institutions such as the police and judiciary. Militarised approaches may, for instance, take a ‘counterinsurgency approach’ to undermine the support for SOC groups. Conversely, they may take a narrower approach focused on a particular manifestation of SOC, or a particular geographical area. They may be more or less constrained by democratic and human rights norms.

² Given the time available for this review, selection focused on evidence from contexts that are, broadly speaking, eligible for overseas development assistance (ODA) at a range of income levels. There is a fairly extensive literature on militarised approaches in high income countries, with the US as one country in particular where there could be interesting lessons to pull out from research.

- It is also important to distinguish different contexts. In settings where the state has no control, militarised approaches may be necessary. Post-conflict settings may benefit from military interventions in the short term. However, in the longer term, political economy analysis or similar is needed to effectively understand the drivers of SOC and the possible positive or negative contributions of military actions in a given context. Careful attention to the implications for human rights, international humanitarian law and human security is also advocated by authors.
- The use of militarised approaches may be effective alongside other measures. However, it has been suggested that a focus on militarised approaches can divert resources and attention from other measures such as policing, prosecution and economic development.
- Serious and organised crime is sustained by a number of drivers. Militarised approaches are shown to address the manifestations of SOC but do little to address issues such as livelihoods, state capacity or trust. In some cases, they may even fail to adequately address the manifestations of SOC if they are not connected to judicial capacity or have a poor strategy, or if they lead to more violence.
- Military units or militarised police may commit human rights abuses, such as killing civilians. Militarised approaches may undermine the rule of law by undertaking violent responses without legal or democratic oversight. In some contexts, they may breed distrust among the population, although there is also evidence for higher levels of trust in the military than the police in some contexts, such as in many Latin American states.
- The efficacy of militarised approaches may be seriously undermined by corruption, as organised criminals co-opt military units, militarised police or citizen militias.
- Militarised approaches have had the effect of stimulating more violence in some contexts, through escalation or a displacement effect. This has been demonstrated through studies of the 'war on drugs' in Latin America.

Annotated bibliography

Law, policy and definitions

Reitano et al. (2018)

Citation: Reitano, T., Jespersen, S. & Bird Ruiz-Benitez de Lugo, L. (Eds.) (2018). *Militarised responses to transnational organised crime: the war on crime*. Cham: Springer International Publishing. <https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-319-57565-0>

Editors: Tuesday Reitano, Deputy Director at the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime; Sasha Jespersen, Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute; Lucia Bird Ruiz-Benitez de Lugo, Director of the Observatory of Illicit Economies in West Africa at the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.

Methods/approach: The book is a collection of essays from workshops run by the Royal United Services Institute and the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, written by academics, policymakers and practitioners. All the essays focus on the issue of militarisation, as manifested in response to wildlife crime; piracy; smuggling of migrants; and drug trafficking. Most focus on a case study, and analysis is based on published literature, including the authors' own papers, and, in some cases, the professional knowledge and experience of the authors. The essays are tied together by a focus on 'militarised approaches'. Some are discussed in separate entries below.

Summary: The editors' key takeaways include the importance of political rhetoric in encouraging militarisation, as well as public pressure, political expediency, the urgency of the threat, and institutional interests. The book points to benefits from militarisation, namely signalling to partners; changing the calculations of organised criminals; and increasing civilian capacities. The costs of militarisation include dependency, stymying alternative policies, undermining human rights protection, undermining civilian law enforcement and corruption.

Jespersen's introductory chapter defines a militarised response in relation to development-focused responses, and notes the different forms of militarisation, from direct military action to partnership. It argues that the level of governance is the key determinant of whether a 'hard' military response will be needed; for example, post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina and Somalia; but highlights the many factors, such as economic development and policing and security capacity, that may also need to be addressed in fighting organised crime, and conceives of militarised approaches as 'one end of a spectrum'.

Shaw's introductory chapter suggests that militarisation is often a simplistic solution to a complex problem. Referring to the chapters of the book, he states that 'many experts

have pointed out, what is required is a package of demand reduction, economic incentives, law enforcement and political initiatives' (p. 7). He outlines different definitions of militarisation, including 'war talk', military tactics used by non-military organisations, and the use of soldiers. He also sets out a model of the militarisation process, comprising war talk, strategic timing and institutional interests, arguing that the three elements can reinforce each other and sustain militarisation, making it difficult to reverse.

The book finds that militarisation can have the benefits of signalling to partners and publics that the authorities are taking crime seriously; deterring SOC groups in the short term. However, such approaches often downgrade human rights concerns, undermine law enforcement, cause corruption and divert attention and resources from long-term solutions. The editors argue that militarised responses can be a blunt solution. While they can be effective, strategic analysis is required to determine where they can be deployed effectively. Integrated approaches, which may include militarised responses, are put forward as necessary to effectively fight SOC. Several chapters in the book demonstrate this by showing how military approaches can only address some manifestations of SOC, and rarely address the drivers. For instance, in judging the relative roles of military, private security, legal and development-led approaches, Shortland's chapter highlights the limits of a military-only strategy and the need for multiple tools.

Potential implications for policy:

- The need for clear strategies when deploying military solutions. A military approach to deterring or pacifying violent crime may need to be linked to, for instance, judicial capacity to prosecute.
- The need for integrated responses, linking military and non-military sectors, which address the drivers of SOC.
- The consequences of militarisation can include increases in violence, corruption and a lack of accountability.

Ucko and Marks (2022)

Citation: Ucko, D. H. & Marks, T. A. (2022). *Organised Crime as Irregular Warfare: Strategic Lessons for Assessment and Response*. SOC ACE Research Paper No. 4. University of Birmingham. <https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/documents/college-social-sciences/government-society/publications/organised-crime-irregular-warfare-report.p.df>

Authors. David Ucko, Professor, College of International Security Affairs (CISA), National Defense University, Washington DC. Thomas A. Marks, Distinguished Professor & MG Edward G. Lansdale Chair of Irregular Warfighting Strategy, College of International Security Affairs (CISA), National Defense University (NDU), Washington, DC.

Methods/approaches: The paper seeks to map concepts and lessons from irregular warfare, especially counterinsurgency, to responses to organised crime. Irregular warfare theory 'situates divergent or illicit behaviour within a political context, treating the "threat actor" not as an isolated problem but as a symptom of a socioeconomic-political system that must also be understood and addressed' (p. 6). It focuses on 'legitimacy as the strategic centre of gravity' (p. 6). It reviews recent US approaches to terrorism and insurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq, and various responses to organised crime, to highlight lessons and the value of irregular warfare concepts. It draws on examples of attempts to suppress drug trafficking in South America and Southeast Asia, the Russian mafia, and wildlife crime in Africa, among others.

Summary: The authors argue that an irregular warfare lens can help address organised crime. There are many similarities between insurgencies and serious and organised crime, including collective action, the use of violence, and corrupting effects. Organised crime operates primarily for monetary gain, and insurgencies aim for legitimacy above all else, but both seek legitimacy to influence populations and institutions. They can therefore be addressed in similar ways.

Using examples from across the world, the paper finds that policy against organised crime is often narrow and does not address underlying causes. Militarised responses are often counterproductive in that they negatively affect whole communities and are based on often unrealistic images of local institutions. More analysis of informal political economies and the ways that crime is socially and politically embedded is needed. The authors argue that military responses, defined as the use of the military as well as a theory of victory based on a suppressive logic, typically produce a hydra effect. Their appeal is based in their potential for deterrence, their speed, and their popular appeal, but their use can often deflect from the need for a broader response. By contrast, counterinsurgency activities focus on contesting the legitimacy of their opponents in the context of local norms, institutions and economies.

Potential implications for policy:

- The suppressive logic, focused on deterrence, of militarised responses often has the effect of displacing, rather than eradicating, organised crime.

- The paper argues that lessons from counterinsurgency can be usefully applied to fighting organised crime. This requires an understanding of organised crime groups within the socio-political system and addressing the political drivers and narratives supporting and justifying their position. The paper suggests a framework through which to craft effective strategies against organised crime, based on irregular warfare theory that has since been published.³

Perret (2023)

Citation: Perret, A. (2023). Militarization and privatization of security: From the War on Drugs to the fight against organized crime in Latin America. *International Review of the Red Cross*, 105 (923), 828-848. <https://international-review.icrc.org/articles/militarization-and-privatization-of-security-923>

Author: Antoine Perret, Civil Society Organization Development Manager, International Code of Conduct Association, Geneva, Switzerland.

Methods/approach: The paper analyses the applicability of international humanitarian law (IHL) to the conflicts in Mexico and Colombia, using the criteria of the intensity of the conflict and degree of organisation of the conflict parties. It applies existing estimates of violence and journalism and scholarship to the organisation of criminal groups and considers caselaw and the practices of state and non-state actors. It addresses the legal implications of the US use of private military and security companies (PMSCs) in Colombia. It also assesses the decisions of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR).

Summary: The paper addresses how far international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights law (HRW) can be applied to the militarised 'war on drugs' in Latin America. The ability of crime groups to control territory, the intense levels of conflict, and the use of private military and security companies (PMSCs) all raise questions about the applicability of humanitarian and human rights legal frameworks. It finds that much of the conflict between criminal groups and state militaries, police forces or PMSCs meets the criteria for conflict under IHL (intensity and degree of organisation of conflict parties), but the application of IHL may not be appropriate.

Potential implications for policy:

- Recommends the application of IHL to complement human rights law, based on the decisions of the IACHR.

Caveats to consider:

- Based on a Latin American institution, the IACHR, which is unlikely to be applicable elsewhere.

³ Ucko, D. & Marks, T. (2023). *A framework for countering organised crime: strategy, planning and the lessons of irregular warfare*. SOC ACE Research Paper 19, September.

Stambol (2019)

Citation: Stambøl, E. M. (2019). The rise of crimefare Europe: Fighting migrant smuggling in West Africa. *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 24(3), 287-307.
<https://doi.org/10.54648/eerr2019026>

Author: Eva Magdalena Stambøl, Postdoctoral Fellow – Department of Criminology and Sociology of Law, University of Oslo.

Methods/approaches: The paper analyses European Union projects on crime and migration in the Sahel region to show their spending, prioritisation, and conceptualisation of crime and migration. It also uses fieldwork in Niger, Mali and Senegal to assess the effects of the EU's approach on local economic and security conditions.

Summary: The EU seeks to combat terrorist groups, drug smugglers and human traffickers in the Sahel region, which it sees as a potential source of instability. Despite a liberal state-building discourse, the EU supports many illiberal and militarised practices in the region. The article suggests that a securitised policy focus is displacing the EU's liberal state-building policies, although does not assess the efficacy of the latter in combating SOC. Its Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF), a humanitarian and development fund, has been largely used to support surveillance, border control and militarisation. Its European Union Training Mission (EUTM) trains local forces, and supports the G5 Sahel Joint Force and French forces. It also helps to draft regional, national and sub-national laws and policies. The author argues that these increasingly centralised security-focused policies do not address the economic basis for migration or acknowledge the reality of the hybrid security order in the region. These initiatives are resisted by those whose livelihoods are threatened, and ineffective at the local level, where they increase instability.

Potential implications for policy:

- The EU's security aid to the Sahel is focused on protecting its own borders. Its measures are often 'top-down, donor driven and repressive, lacking context and conflict sensitivity' (p. 306), and can be counterproductive.
- The need to understand the local political economy of serious and organised crime, and local governance systems when implementing security measures. It is also implied that a broader state-building and development focus might be needed.

Caveats to consider:

- The case studies are focused on anti-migration examples rather than tackling SOC.

Cockayne (2014)

Citation: Cockayne, J. (2014). *The UN Security Council and organized criminal activity: Experiments in international law enforcement*. United Nations University Working Paper Series, No. 3. United Nations University.

https://collections.unu.edu/eserv/UNU:3124/wp03_oqa.pdf

Author: James Cockayne, Professor at the University of Nottingham, New South Wales Anti-Slavery Commissioner.

Methods/approach: The paper reviews the policy and practice of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) with respect to organised crime since the early 2000s and considers the implications for anti-crime action and the role of the UNSC. The paper delineates and reviews four modes of enforcement, including two that feature militarised approaches: collective enforcement (for example, through anti-piracy naval operations off Somalia); and direct enforcement (through executive policing and military action by the UN against criminal groups, for example in Kosovo and Haiti).

Summary: The UNSC has attempted to address criminal activity related to drug trafficking, diamond, mineral and wildlife trafficking and piracy. Obstacles to the UNSC's work include '1) sovereignty; 2) limited access to effective law enforcement and judicial capacity; and 3) due process' (p. 1). With regards to direct enforcement through executive policing and military action, the report concludes that the most effective action was that taken in Haiti in 2007. However, such action raises questions about whether the UNSC should be acting politically or judicially. In some contexts, the UNSC uses criminal justice approaches, whereas in others it seeks to treat groups as potential 'partners for peace' (p. 7).

With regards to anti-piracy naval initiatives, such as those undertaken by the EU, NATO and others off Somalia, the paper finds that the longstanding status of piracy as a crime in international law, its taking place in international waters, and the incentive for states to support anti-piracy action, all make it easier to pursue such responses. However, states pursuing pirates have had difficulties prosecuting the pirates because of a lack of effective judicial capacity for due process. It also points to difficulties prosecuting some parts of the supply chain, such as London-based financial services organisations and security organisations that facilitate payments to pirates, because of the British UNSC veto, or Nigerian reluctance to support efforts in the Gulf of Guinea because of links to its economy. Somalia had a particularly weak government at that time, meaning foreign navies could easily gain permission to operate in Somali territory.

Potential implications for policy:

- The UNSC should carefully consider how far it should use a rhetoric of criminal justice given that it is a political body.
- International militarised interventions need to be supplemented by appropriate judicial capacity.
- There are geographical and political limits to the ability of the UNSC to act against transnational organised crime.

- Such approaches often have successes against the manifestation of the crime rather than the drivers.

Caveats to consider:

- The paper discusses a range of UNSC approaches, only some of which are militarised.

Boutellis and Tielès (2019)

Citation: Boutellis, A. & Tiélès, S. (2019). Peace operations and organised crime: Still foggy? In de Coning, D. & Peter, M. *United Nations Peace Operations in a Changing Global Order* (pp. 169–190). Cham: Springer International Publishing.

https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-99106-1_9

Authors: Arthur Boutellis, International Peace Institute, and Stephanie Tiélès, Central Directorate of Judicial Police (International Relations Division).

Methods/approach: The chapter reviews UN thinking on OC and peace, main approaches and limits, and offers recommendations. It focuses on the Sahel region. It considers policy development, and provides a comparative overview of UN approaches, including but not limited to militarised ones.

Summary: It is widely agreed that SOC is an issue in conflict/post-conflict situations, with the potential to exacerbate conflict and act as a spoiler to peace deals. However, there is a lack of evidence on whether UN peace missions are an effective way to address SOC. Existing evidence shows that addressing organised crime can lead to retaliation – threats to UN forces – and tend to be overly focused on security rather than development. There are inherent limits to peace missions as ways to combat organised crime. Whereas OC adapts and changes, peace missions are time-limited and not entirely focused on OC. Militarised approaches can help to overcome spoilers to peace, but collaboration with other approaches and actors is needed for longer-term success.

The chapter shows that 75% of peacekeeping missions are deployed in contexts with transnational organised crime (TNOC) (including Guinea Bissau, Afghanistan, Libya, Somalia, and Colombia, the big multidimensional operations in DRC, Central African Republic (CAR), Mali, South Sudan), but fewer than half have explicit mandates on organised crime. The lack of a clear mandate can limit resources and strategic focus on the issue. However, the chapter also gives examples where UN missions without a specific mandate on crime have been proactive on the issue (Kosovo, Timor-Leste and Haiti) and that a mandate does not necessarily lead to success (Guinea-Bissau).

It finds that 'the UN system and Member States are still uncertain about how to approach a phenomenon that lacks a precise definition and, more importantly, refers to various criminal activities or threats understood differently based on contexts and perception' (p. 170).

Potential implications for policy:

- While the UN and others have identified SOC as an issue in peacekeeping situations, few missions have specific mandates to address it.
- Peacekeeping forces are usually short-term in nature and so may not be able to address locally-rooted SOC more than superficially.

Hunt (2019)

Citation: Hunt, C.T. (2019). Rhetoric versus reality in the rise of policing in UN peace operations: 'More blue, less green'? *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 73(6), 609-627. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2019.1685936>

Author: Charles T. Hunt, Associate Professor of International Relations in the School of Global, Urban & Social Studies at RMIT University in Melbourne.

Methods/approach: An assessment of the role of United Nations Police (UNPOL) in peace missions after and during conflicts, the implications of these changes, and recommendations for policy, based on analysis of policy and fieldwork at headquarters and in the field.

Summary: UNPOL is often tasked with tackling SOC, but without a clear strategy. Transnational organised crime (TNOG) raises particular difficulties for UNPOL: geography (the transnational nature of some crime); host state consent (which makes it difficult to tackle crime where the state benefits); lack of strategy; a focus on law enforcement without political and development strategy.

UNPOL increasingly uses militarised tactics. Formed police units (FPUs) are often used in insecure settings (two-thirds of UNPOL missions). The units 'invariably drive armoured vehicles, carry arms, often wearing military-like fatigues, and tend to pass through town without much interaction' (p. 616). This militarisation 'represents an internal contradiction for the UN sending mixed messages to societies recovering from violent conflict often characterised by abusive and highly militarised security forces' (p. 616). Failures of protection and sexual abuse erode trust and makes intelligence-led policing hard.

Potential implications for policy:

- The use of militarised units in peacekeeping missions can send mixed messages.
- The potential for abuses by militarised forces, and consequence loss of trust in UN peace missions.

Caveats to consider:

- Only one part of UNPOL is militarised.

Kan (2024)

Citation: Kan, P. R. (2014). Forces of habit: Global SOF's role in countering illicit drug trafficking. *Journal of Strategic Security*, 7(2), 21-28.
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/26465182>

Author: Paul Rexton Kan is Professor of National Security Studies and former Henry L. Stimson Chair of Military Studies at the US Army War College.

Summary: Short paper suggesting how to adapt Special Operations Forces (SOF) approaches to address drug trafficking. It argues that trafficking 'intersects with major security issues such as rogue and narco-states, weak and failing states, insurgencies and terrorism, transnational organized crime and protracted intrastate conflicts' which need to be addressed together (p. 21).

Methods/approaches: The paper assesses the evolving United States Department of Defense (DoD) policy in countering the illicit narcotics trade, centred on the role of SOF. It identifies several contexts to which SOF may be applied: rogue and narco states; weak and failing states; insurgencies and terrorism; transnational criminal organisations; and protracted intrastate conflicts, and shows how they are linked to drug trafficking and present as security problems for the US.

The paper does not assess the efficacy of particular approaches in any detail. Rather, it sketches broad policy issues, based on DoD policy, think tank reports, news reports and the author's professional experience.

Potential implications for policy:

- Highlights the different contexts in which SOC may manifest, and how they may affect US interests.

Caveats to consider:

- The paper was written in 2014 so gives no indication of US policy since then.
- It gives no assessment of the efficacy of DoD policy at a global or local level.

Stabilisation

Friesendorf and Penska (2008)

Citation: Friesendorf, C. & Penska, S. E. (2008). Militarized law enforcement in peace operations: EUFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina. *International Peacekeeping*, 15(5), 677-694. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13533310802396277>

Author: Cornelius Friesendorf, Head of the Centre for OSCE Research (CORE), Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH), and Susan E. Penska, Professor of Political Science at Westmont University.

Methods/approaches: Analyses the role of the European Union Force (EUFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 2004. It situates EUFOR's role in the broader problem of the use of peacekeeping forces in stabilisation processes. It is based on an analysis of EUFOR policy, minutes, and interviews with participants.

Summary: EUFOR, a force initiated to implement the peace agreement, was given a role in the fight against organised crime because of the belief that the defeat of SOC is a precondition for stabilisation. This role was assigned to a military force because of the 'security gap' following conflict, wherein the local police are 'tainted' by association with the conflict and it is difficult for foreign donors to send police. EUFOR replaced NATO's Stabilization Force (SFOR).

The paper argues that the European Union Force (EUFOR) had some tactical successes against organised crime but did not systematically address it. While it was able to lead highly visible operations, and thus inspire some degree of confidence, it could not undertake the systematic work needed to address crime.

It highlights the 'problematic' nature of military involvement in law enforcement, including difficulties of coordination with local and donor-funded police, problems of public perception, inappropriate tasks, and an inability to tackle the root causes. Since 2006, EUFOR engagement has been less assertive and more coordinated with domestic and international police forces.

Potential implications for policy:

- Addresses the issue of militarised law enforcement within the context of a stabilisation mission, and the post-conflict 'security gap' that may require military substitutes for police.
- The paper highlights 'the impact that individual policymakers and military commanders have on shaping and interpreting mission mandates and roles; the evolution of regional institutions; and the perception of fighting crime as a precondition for successful post-conflict stabilization efforts' (p. 678).

Cockayne (2014)

Citation: Cockayne, J. (2014). The futility of force? Strategic lessons for dealing with unconventional armed groups from the UN's war on Haiti's gangs. *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 37(5), 736-769. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2014.901911>

Author: James Cockayne, Professor at the University of Nottingham, and New South Wales Anti-Slavery Commissioner.

Methods/approaches: The analysis of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)'s efforts to defeat gangs in Haiti is based on published sources, interviews and UN documents.

Summary: The paper argues that the UN peacekeeping force, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), was able to defeat criminal gangs in the short term through evolving military and intelligence tactics. However, MINUSTAH was unable to address the patronage links between gangs and the Haitian state or address the local conditions in which gangs could flourish. MINUSTAH's use of force against gangs was initially unsuccessful because of poor planning. As well as failing to take control, civilians were killed, which led to severe criticism within Haiti and internationally. Following greater use of local informants and better planning, the force was able to secure successes against the gangs by identifying leaders likely to switch, cutting off revenue sources, and taking key strategic buildings. Nevertheless, the paper argues that the efforts were unable to address the causes of gangs.

Potential implications for policy:

- Tactical innovations allowed MINUSTAH to defeat the gangs.
- However, the response was unable to address the political support for the gangs. A militarised response may be limited by the command structure. In this case, the fact that it was invited by the state limited how far it could address the role of state patronage networks.
- The paper argues that it 'remains unclear whether MINUSTAH – or any other robust peace operation – possesses the strategic framework needed to understand and address these kinds of non-conventional or “rhizomatic’ adversaries” (p. 737).
- Militarised responses in densely populated areas have a high chance of incurring casualties among the population not part of the gangs.

International Peace Institute (2013)

Citation: Kemp, W., Shaw, M. & Boutellis, A. (2013). *The elephant in the room: How can peace operations deal with organized crime?* International Peace Institute.

https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/elephant_in_the_room.pdf

Authors: Walter Kemp is Director of Global Strategy against TOC at the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime. Mark Shaw is the Director of the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime. Arthur Boutellis is non-resident Senior Adviser at the International Peace Institute.

Methods/approaches: A section of this report (pp. 32-45) analyses the attention given to SOC in UN peacekeeping mandates and practice, as well as examples from other peacekeeping forces. It analyses the political economy of crime in three case studies and assesses the efforts of peace operations to address SOC.

Summary: Through an analysis of UN peacekeeping mission mandates, the report finds that UN peacekeepers do not sufficiently address the threat of organized crime. It presents three case studies, namely Guinea-Bissau, Haiti and Kosovo, to show the importance of organised crime in post-conflict economies and polities. As well as outlining the problem of organised crime in these contexts, it also assesses peacekeeping efforts to curtail organised crime – including through policing, military action and capacity building – finding insufficient attention given to the problem. It does not specifically address militarised approaches but generally advocates for holistic approaches linking national and international actors and different forms of action, arguing in the case of Haiti in 2006 that a ‘militarized approach that does not address the broader political economy has limitations’ (p. 36).

Potential implications for policy:

- Highlights the potential of SOC to spoil peace processes, and the importance of making assessments of SOC in any peace plan.
- Points to the limited attention given to the problem by UN Security Council mandates, as well as by peace operations by other actors.
- Provides analysis of how SOC can become embedded in conflict, post-conflict and fragile contexts, and thereby points to the range of tools and actors that may be needed to address it. It also provides information on the efforts to tackle SOC in the case study countries up to 2013.
- It emphasises the importance of addressing the problem at an early stage, based on effective assessments of the threat, intelligence-sharing between relevant experts and actors, and the development of capacity.

Caveats to consider:

- The report is not focused on militarisation specifically and discusses peace operations, including peacebuilding and political missions, with relatively little attention to the issue of ‘militarisation’.

Pingout (2018)

Citation: Pingeot, L. (2018). United Nations peace operations as international practices: Revisiting the UN mission's armed raids against gangs in Haiti. *European Journal of International Security*, 3(3), 364-381. <https://doi.org/10.1017/eis.2018.4>

Author: Lou Pingeot, Postdoctoral Fellow at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs and the Centre for International Policy Studies, University of Ottawa.

Methods/approach: Analyses texts produced by mid-level MINUSTAH staff at UN Peace Operations in Haiti through the lens of international practice theory (IPT).

Summary: Advocates for the use of international practice theory (IPT) to understand how and why certain practices, such as militarised approaches to crime, are employed. In the case of Haiti, the use of joint police-military forces was the product of factors such as foreign funders' support of the Haitian government, and the previous experience of some UN forces in militarised attacks on Brazilian favelas, among other factors. The paper highlights the debates and uncertainties among the military leadership over how to deal with criminal gangs, with some advocating for a more development-focused approach, and some fearful of causing civilian casualties.

Potential implications for policy:

- Understanding the role of mid-level staff in decision-making.
- The need to understand both discourse and practice in understanding how problems are acted upon.
- The uncertainties in how to approach organised crime among policymakers and practitioners.

Tinti (2022)

Citation: Tinti, P. (2022). *Whose crime is it anyway? Organized crime and international stabilization efforts in Mali*. Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime. <https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Whose-crime-is-it-anyway-web.pdf>

Author: Peter Tinti, Senior Research Fellow at the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, lecturer at the Committee on International Relations, University of Chicago, and independent journalist.

Methods/approaches: The report is based on analysis of policy documents and stabilisation initiatives, and interviews with actors, experts and researchers involved in Mali.

It traces the framing of the mandates of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), the G5 Sahel Joint Force and Task Force

Takuba since 2013. At the same time, it outlines the development of instability in Mali, highlighting the development of ‘militarized protection economies’ (p. 6) linked to state security structures since before 2012. It assesses international actors’ approaches and priorities, using an analysis of the different conflict economies operating in the country, to offer a critical stance on their effectiveness. It looks at arms trafficking, gold mining, migrant smuggling, livestock theft and links between high state officials and organised crime.

Summary: The paper assesses the dynamics of crime, terrorism and international intervention within the economies and governance of Mali. It argues that international actors have misinterpreted the dynamics of crime and conflict, and focus on technical and militarised approaches, such as capacity building, rather than the developmental needs of communities. Although international policymakers have identified the role of SOC as threats to peace and security, they have oversimplified the link between organised crime and terrorism and have not implemented effective policies to address it. It argues that the international actors tend to characterise conflict issues as technical rather than addressing their real political dynamics. By contrast, the paper argues that organised crime is ubiquitous across the country and interacts in different and specific ways with the interests of politicians, armed groups and communities, which need to be understood in order to formulate effective policies.

Potential implications for policy:

- Suggests that policymakers need to more carefully analyse the economies of crime and violence in a given country.
- Crime is entangled in many aspects of Sahelian states’ society, economy and government.
- External priorities, such as the desire to reduce migrant smuggling, or a need for clear targets, can drive international actors to unrealistic assessments of the situation.
- Different illicit economies affect stability in different ways. For instance, some provide livelihoods, whereas others may empower criminals.
- A focus on development activities may better address some of the effects of criminal activities in Mali.
- Organised crime should be incorporated into early warning systems.

Caveats to consider:

- The paper discusses tackling organised crime as part of wider stabilisation and development efforts.

Caparini (2022)

Citation: Caparini, M. (2022). *Conflict, governance and organized crime: Complex challenges for UN stabilization operations*. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). <https://doi.org/10.55163/NOWM6453>

Author: Marina Caparini, Senior Researcher, United Nations University.

Methods/approaches: Analysis of the crime-complex nexus in three fragile and conflict-affected states, and of the role of UN peacekeepers. Seeks to understand the role of crime in these states and their conflict dynamics. Uses policy documents and interviews with peacekeepers to draw lessons and recommendations on their role. Outlines a number of theories of governance that are applied to fragile and conflict-affected states, highlighting the hybrid nature of governance.

Summary: Discusses the blurred relationship between non-state armed groups, state-embedded actors and crime, highlighting the difficulty of distinguishing organised crime actors, and instead recommending viewing organised crime as a strategy undertaken by many actors (p. 10). Organised crime plays an important role in sustaining conflict and instability, but the complexity of the situations makes it hard for stabilisation efforts to address them.

In DRC, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) has worked to build capacity in the DRC's police. Corruption, patronage and conflict economies are barriers to progress. The report suggests difficulties raised by state institutions handling cases to do with illicit exploitation of resources, when state actors are likely to be involved in such activities. MONUSCO has also used military force to clear areas of armed groups, although the area has not been stabilised. Some argue that stabilisation is a prerequisite for capacity building.

In CAR, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MUNUSCA) was deployed in 2014 to protect civilians, support the state and the transitional political process, DDR and justice and the rule of law. It supported security sector reform, and seized illegal arms. Illicit mining is a source of revenue for non-state, state and foreign armed groups. However, MUNUSCA has not focused on combating organised crime, except through capacity building, and has therefore only addressed one part of the political economy.

In Mali, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)'s mandate did not explicitly include organised crime until 2018. It undertakes capacity building in the justice sector, but the report doubts the efficacy of this while 'underlying patterns of clientelism and patronage networks' persist and 'the authorities in state institutions remain closely linked to organized crime and illicit trafficking' (p. 31). As well as a lack of political will from the state, the report identifies a lack of coordination between MINUSMA's military (which can respond to attacks), and police bodies (which can collect evidence).

Potential implications for policy:

- Provides concepts and evidence to help understand the complex ecology of crime and conflict in these three states.
- Emphasises the need to understand and address the political economy of crime and conflict, and the limitations of focusing on one aspect (such as capacity building).
- Argues that the UN stabilisation mandates do not fully acknowledge the links between crime, conflict and governance nor do they have sufficient contextual knowledge of the issue.
- A focus on capacity building of state institutions ignores important aspects of the political economy in these states, and more analysis of the links between crime and political actors is needed.
- Provides detailed analysis of the relevant institutions and actors.

Wildlife crime

Duffy et al. (2019)

Citation: Duffy, R., Massé, F., Smidt, E., Marijnen, E., Büscher, B., Verweijen, J., Ramutsindela, M., Simlai, T., Joanny, L. & Lunstrum, E. (2019). Why we must question the militarisation of conservation. *Biological Conservation*, 232, 66-73.

<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biocon.2019.01.013>

Lead author: Rosaleen Duffy, Chair in International Politics at the University of Sheffield.

Methods/approaches: The paper provides a synthesis of existing literature, including the authors' own; usually single case studies of African or South American states. It is focused on arguments against the militarisation of conservation. It defines militarised approaches as: 'more forceful or armed forms of conservation'; 'the development and application of military style approaches'; 'the development of informant networks, and counterinsurgency-like strategies'; and 'the use and applications of technologies originally developed by the military' (p. 66).

Summary: The paper identifies the following main issues related to the militarisation of anti-poaching measures:

- The importance of understanding how poaching is defined. Definitions of poaching can vary, and targeting can create a simplistic view of 'heroes and villains', while ignoring local economies and grievances (such as against anti-poaching rangers).
- The experiences of local communities, particularly the potential for the use of informants and violence to create mistrust, and to displace communities, undermining community support on which effective conservation is often based.
- The experiences of rangers, including violence and trauma.
- The challenges of conservation in areas of armed conflict. Studies find that militarised approaches can 'embed conflict dynamics further' in conflict zones and lead to escalation (p. 69). It notes that working with the UN means taking sides in a conflict.
- Some government-run military conservationists are involved in poaching. Working with militaries can mean working with repressive actors, which can bring reputational damage and undermine support. The paper also cites criticism of the widely-circulated claim that armed groups are funded by the illegal wildlife trade.
- Attention to the political economy of the link between conservation and militarisation necessitates an understanding of the way that military forces and private security companies can make money from militarised approaches. Funding such approaches also diverts resources from other conservation efforts. Surveillance and intelligence-gathering also raise data protection risks.

Potential implications for policy:

- The findings emphasise the complex political and economic contexts in which poaching takes place, and likelihood of unintended consequences from militarised interventions.
- Militarised approaches can only address one facet of poaching and may be counterproductive.

Caveats to consider:

- The review deliberately focuses on evidence of the negative effects of militarised approaches.

Shaw and Rademeyer (2016)

Citation: Shaw, M. & Rademeyer, J. (2016). A flawed war: Rethinking 'green militarisation' in the Kruger National Park. *Politikon*, 43(2), 173-192.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/02589346.2016.1201379>

Methods/approaches: An analysis of the response to rhino poaching in Kruger national park, in order to question the concept of 'green militarisation'. It provides an analysis of the interests involved in conservation, government rhetoric and priorities, national security decisions, and uses interviews and engagement with key stakeholders.

Findings: It argues that the response in Kruger does not straightforwardly conform to the 'green militarisation' narrative. While there is militarisation, and there are human rights abuses, the picture is more complex. Many interpretations of South African anti-poaching policy rest too much on apartheid-era stereotypes. The militarisation of anti-poaching is not part of a broader state discourse, although the parks' authorities have used forceful measures and killed many individuals.

It uses the example of the South African state declining a US invitation to share intelligence to show that the state does not consider poaching to be a national security threat. It also shows, with arrest statistics and interviews, that South African National Defence Force (SANDF) soldiers are mainly focused on border protection rather than counter-poaching. The South African National Parks authority (SANParks) does include some units with military training and uses militaristic language. Hundreds of suspected poachers have been killed. However, this militarisation is not part of a national security effort and SANParks efforts remain small-scale. Police intelligence and action on poachers is lacking, mainly because of limited resources in the face of high crime rates across the country.

Potential implications for policy:

- The need to effectively interrogate concepts like 'green militarisation' when applying them to particular contexts.
- The lack of coherent and fully funded police support for anti-poaching in South Africa.

- The need to understand the interests and priorities of different actors – in this case, the state and security sector's low prioritisation of anti-poaching measures.

Caveats:

- The evidence is drawn from Kruger National Park and South Africa. Militarisation still can be said to describe some of SANParks practices, as well as those in other states.

Maguire (2018)

Citation: Maguire, T. J. (2018). Kenya's 'war on poaching': Militarised solutions to a militarised problem? In Reitano, T., Jespersen, S., & Bird Ruiz-Benitez de Lugo, L. (Eds.), *Militarised responses to transnational organised crime: the war on crime* (pp. 61-90). Cham: Springer International Publishing.

https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-57565-0_5

Author: Thomas J. Maguire is a Fellow in the Intelligence and International Security Research Group at the Department of War Studies, King's College London, and a Junior Research Fellow at Darwin College and the Department of Politics and International Studies (POLIS), University of Cambridge.

Methods/approaches: The chapter analyses the drivers and impacts of poaching in Kenyan society. It questions narratives that have labelled poaching as part of an 'insurgency' or an 'ivory-terrorism nexus'. It provides an overview of different approaches in recent decades, both state- and private-led, and considers how they interact with the complex drivers of the trade, and its local and international dimensions.

Summary: The author argues that the realities of wildlife crime are more complex than a simplistic rhetoric of war on poachers or an ivory-terrorism nexus. Militarised responses to poaching ignore other dynamics, namely 'a close nexus between wildlife poaching, cattle rustling, road banditry, and inter-communal conflict, with weapons and individuals rotating between all four' (p. 69). The poachers do not constitute an insurgency and there is mixed evidence for the militarisation of poaching. A 'war on poaching', led by armed units of police and army, and the Kenya Wildlife Service, the latter trained by US and UK forces, is narrow and inflammatory. It lacks capacity to prosecute leaders of the trade. However, there are other facets to the response. The Kenyan Wildlife Trust and community rangers also serve to fill a law and order vacuum in rural areas. They and charities such as the Northern Rangeland Trust (NRT) are part of a more holistic approach that supports community-based initiatives, and uses up-to-date intelligence.

Potential implications for policy

- Focuses on the value of public-private partnerships and innovative approaches used by the NRT.

Anti-piracy and anti-migration

Shortland (2018)

Citation: Shortland, A. (2018). Dangers of success: The economics of Somali piracy. In Reitano, T., Jespersen, S., & Bird Ruiz-Benitez de Lugo, L. (Eds.), *Militarised responses to transnational organised crime: the war on crime* (pp. 169-183). Cham: Springer International Publishing. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-57565-0_10

Author: Anja Shortland, Professor in Political Economy, King's College London.

Methods/approach: the chapter analyses the economic costs and benefits of various approaches to tackling piracy off Somalia for the pirates, Somali citizens, and those implementing the approaches.

Summary: As part of a book section on militarised approaches to piracy in the Gulf of Aden/Indian Ocean, Southeast Asia and the Gulf of Guinea, the chapter argues that militarisation was the result of private actions as well as state naval interventions. The naval approach, including the EU's Operation Atalanta, as well as NATO, US, Russian, Chinese and other forces, was supported by a UN Security Council Resolution. The common interest in solving the problem enabled the coalition to be built. Legal capacity, to arrest and convict pirates, was also needed to make naval interceptions a credible threat.

However, the insurer-driven process of private ships installing water cannons, razor wire, citadels, and armed guards was vital to stopping attacks, given the time it takes a naval vessel to reach a ship under attack. While the naval approach, combined with private security measures, was able to stop piracy in the short term, the author weighs its costs against land-based approaches. She identifies land-based elites, rather than poor coastal communities, as the key stakeholders. Noting that not every community sheltered pirates, she finds that communities will drive pirates away when they have a viable economic alternative to the erratic and dangerous income from piracy. She suggests that a development approach may be more cost-effective than the cost of naval patrols, using World Bank and other estimates. It questions whether the apparent success of the naval operation has diverted resources from potential investment in coastal development in Somalia.

Potential implications for policy:

- Suggests that a land-based developmental approach has been neglected, and that this neglect may lead to a resurgence of piracy in future.
- Highlights the role of private incentives, in this case from the insurance industry, in pushing for effective ship security, which had an important role in preventing attacks.
- Developmental approaches need to consider the key stakeholders able to encourage or prevent crime, rather than necessarily focusing on the poorest.

- The success of anti-piracy measures in the Gulf of Aden may not be repeatable in larger bodies of water such as the Indian Ocean.
- The decline of attacks and the possibility of 'freeriding' on a situation of safety guaranteed by others' security measures may weaken incentives for shipowners to invest in protecting their ships.

Roberts (2018)

Citation: Roberts, P. (2018). The militarisation of migration: From Triton to Sofia: Assessing the credibility of the EU's naval interventions against migrant smuggling in the Mediterranean. In Reitano, T., Jespersen, S., & Bird Ruiz-Benitez de Lugo, L. (Eds.), *Militarised responses to transnational organised crime: the war on crime* (pp. 217-233). Cham: Springer International Publishing.
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-57565-0_13

Author: Peter Roberts is Senior Research Fellow for Sea Power and Maritime Studies at RUSI, and a former naval officer.

Methods/approaches: Roberts assesses the EU's militarised strategies of stopping migration and people smuggling in the Mediterranean in 2015 and 2016. It seeks to explain the reasons for the EU's use of naval force, and to assess its results and theories for the drivers of migration. It is based on an analysis of EU strategies and policies, comparing the naval Operation Sophia with the EU policy of processing centres in Türkiye for Syrian refugees, juxtaposed with findings on the drivers of migration.

Summary: Roberts argues that Operation Sophia, established in June 2015, had a flawed conception in that it oversimplified the problem and was not accompanied by punitive capacity. It was based on a discredited 'push-pull' model of migration and aimed to make migration less attractive through surveillance, interdiction and destruction of smuggling networks. However, it did not have the ability to put people ashore in Libya and was too small to effectively police the Mediterranean. The use of the template of the EU's anti-piracy mission in Somalia, Atalanta, was misguided as the problem is different. He contrasts the efforts of Sophia with the EU policy of processing centres in Türkiye, which did reduce border crossings across the Aegean. He argues that Sophia has a flawed strategy, and that destroying boats does not fix the demand for migration but instead possibly pushed migration to smaller boats. The operation was not accompanied by a longer-term potential solution such as repatriation or resettlement and so did not address demand.

Potential implications for policy:

- The chapter highlights the need for a 'feasible and coherent strategy' rather than relying on a template from other contexts.
- It emphasises the need to understand the drivers of migration if it wants to address them.
- The inappropriateness of using naval force for police enforcement or humanitarian purpose.

The 'war on drugs'

Blair and Weintraub (2023)

Citation: Blair, R. A., & Weintraub, M. (2023). Little evidence that military policing reduces crime or improves human security. *Nature Human Behaviour*, 7, 861-873. <https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-023-01600-1>

Authors: Robert A. Blair, Arkadij Eisler Goldman Sachs Associate Professor of Political Science and International and Public Affairs, Brown University; and Michael Weintraub, Associate Professor in the Escuela de Gobierno Alberto Lleras Camargo at Universidad de los Andes in Bogotá, Colombia, and Director of the Security and Violence Area of the Center for the Study of Security and Drugs (CESED).

Methods/approaches: An experimental analysis of the area-based use of the military to combat crime in Cali, Colombia. It uses time-stamped, geolocated administrative data on crime and human rights abuses, surveys of 10,000 respondents and observations from civilian monitors who accompanied the military on patrol. It uses a sample of 1,255 blocks, 214 of which are treatment blocks, 765 adjacent to treatment blocks, and 275 control blocks.

Summary: The paper looks at the government's Plan Fortaleza programme which deployed nightly military patrols in 'hotspot' areas in the highly violent city of Cali, Colombia. It finds small increases in crime in the areas where the military patrolled, measured by both administrative data and citizen reports. It also finds little evidence that the programme increased perceptions of safety among citizens. There were no increases in abuses in administrative data, but some in citizen surveys, mostly by police rather than the military. It therefore concludes that the patrols were not effective.

Potential implications for policy:

- The use of military patrols had little to no effect on crime rates and it is therefore likely that their costs outweigh their benefits.
- The findings may be generalisable to similar Latin American cities. However, the authors note that gangs in Cali are only able to exert microcontrol over small territories, rather than cities or regions where gangs exert monopolistic control.
- The programme was short in duration and limited to night-time patrols.
- The behaviour of military patrols may have been changed by the presence of civilian monitors, although the presence of civilians would probably have a similar effect in other settings.

Tobon (2023)

Citation: Tobon, S. (2023). The perils of military policing. *Nature Human Behaviour*, 7, 843-844. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-023-01606-9>

Author: Santiago Tobon, Professor of Economics at Universidad EAFIT in Medellín, Colombia.

Methods/approach: A short commentary summarising the findings of Blair and Weintraub (2023), above, and putting them into the context of the existing literature and highlighting implications for policy.

Summary: Given the popularity of military policing, despite the lack of evidence for its effectiveness, more evidence will be required. Studies on crime reduction in low- and middle-income countries, where SOC compete with state authorities, mean findings from high-income countries are likely to be less applicable. It also points to risks in implementing security policies and the need to plan for adverse consequences.

Potential implications for policy:

- Results on hotspot policing derived from high-income countries may not be replicable in low- or middle-income countries, or where SOC rivals the state.
- More evaluation of the efficacy of anti-crime measures is needed.

McDermott (2018)

Citation: McDermott, J. (2018). Militarisation of the drug war in Latin America: A policy cycle set to continue? In Reitano, T., Jespersen, S., & Bird Ruiz-Benitez de Lugo, L. (Eds.), *Militarised responses to transnational organised crime: the war on crime* (pp. 259-277). https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-57565-0_15

Author: Jeremy McDermott, Executive Director, InSight Crime.

Methods/approach: A discussion of the situation in Latin America, based on published sources, news and policy reports. It includes Colombia and Mexico as case studies. Provides a narrative of the recent history and key findings on the 'drug war', such as number of civilians killed, levels of violence, and status of the organised crime gangs, although it does not discuss the basis of its findings

Summary: The chapter gives a critical account of the militarisation of the 'war on drugs' in Latin America. It notes 'almost unanimous criticism' and states that 'although often backed by popular support, the use of the armed forces in the fight against crime has led to increases in violence and human rights abuses by the armed forces, without inflicting any permanent damage to transnational organized crime (TOC)' (p. 270). It suggests that the weakness of many states in the region means that they often turn to the military to counter powerful, well-armed crime organisations. However, militaries are vulnerable to corruption. Organisational rivalry with police limits cooperation between

the two. A focus of resources on military responses draws resources from fixing problems driving organised crime such as poverty, or reforming justice and policing institutions.

Potential implications for policy:

- Highlights the risks of escalation arising from militarisation.
- Points to weak institutions as a barrier to fighting SOC.
- Suggests the likelihood of continued militarisation in the region.

Macias and Zarkin (2021)

Citation: Macías, G.A. & Zarkin, J.A. (2021). The militarization of law enforcement: evidence from Latin America. *Perspectives on Politics*, 19(2), 519–538. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592719003906>

Author: Gustavo Flores-Macías, Professor of Government and Public Policy, Cornell University and Jessica Zarkin, Assistant Professor, Claremont McKenna College.

Methods/approaches: The paper provides a typology of militarised law enforcement, which it uses to assess the extent and effects of militarisation in Latin America on security, rights, and legal and police institutions. It outlines the forms and extent of militarisation in each Latin American state in the region and provides comparative analysis of their effects. It analyses the effects of the constabularisation of the military, by looking at whether the process has preceded changes in levels of violence, human rights complaints, police reform; and the legal basis of constabularisation. It also provides a case study of Mexico based on a comparison of two municipalities within Sinaloa state.

Summary: The paper distinguishes five types of law enforcement: non-militarised police; militarised police; paramilitary police; limited constabularisation of the military; and generalised constabularisation of the military.

	Non-Militarized Police	Militarized Police	Paramilitary Police	Constabularized Military
Accountability	Civilian law	Civilian law	Civilian law (with some exceptions)	Military law (with some exceptions)
Weaponry	No access to heavier weapons and equipment	Some access to heavier weapons and equipment	Some access to heavier weapons and equipment	Full access to heavier weapons and equipment
Training	Maintain public order (focus on community development and use of force as last resort)	Maintain public order (non-lethal use of force)	Maintain public order (non-lethal use of force)	Engage and destroy
Organizational Structure	Low degree of centralization and hierarchy, bottom-up command, deployed in small groups	Medium degree of centralization and hierarchy, bottom-up command, deployed in small groups and formed units	High degree of centralization and hierarchy, top-down command, deployed in formed units	High degree of centralization and hierarchy, top-down command, deployed in formed units
	←		→	
	Least militarized		Most militarized	

Source: Macías & Zarkin, 2021, p. 521.

By matching data on violence, human rights and police reform with moves to militarisation, the paper makes conclusions about its effects. It finds that increases in violence occurred in six of nine states with generalised constabularisation. Although there is no standardised data on human rights complaints, the paper points to widespread reports of extrajudicial killings in the region. It also finds that constabularisation does not usually lead to police reform.

It finds that a municipality in Sinaloa with a military presence had a higher rate of civilian casualties and more human rights complaints than a neighbouring municipality without a militarised approach. This is consistent with other studies.

Potential implications for policy:

- The need to distinguish types of militarisation based on their institutional status and legal oversight.
- Provides data on the level and type of militarisation across Latin American states.
- Agrees with other studies that militarisation leads to increases in violence and human rights abuses.
- Militarisation can also lessen the likelihood of police reform and contribute to undermining the rule of law.

Caveats to consider:

- It does not directly consider the efficacy of militarised approaches, although it does use relevant indicators (levels of violence, police reform).
- The authors note a 'generalized lack of data and difficulty in establishing systematic indicators that work across contexts, as well as the fact that militaries are often called on to operate in more challenging environments to begin with' (p. 529).

Schuberth (2019)

Citation: Schuberth, M. (2019) Brazilian peacekeeping? Counterinsurgency and police reform in Port-au-Prince and Rio de Janeiro, *International Peacekeeping*, 26(4), 487-510. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2019.1623675>

Author: Moritz Schuberth, CPAID Research Fellow, Firoz Lalji Institute for Africa, London School of Economics.

Methods/approaches: The paper provides an analysis of Brazil's peacekeeping operations based on fieldwork in Port-au-Prince and semi-structured interviews with key informants. It seeks to characterise Brazil's methods and show the transfer of practices between settings.

Summary: The paper challenges the view that Brazil's engagements in Haiti and Rio de Janeiro have been repressive, as they include cooperative measures and have sought to win hearts and minds as part of their strategy. It focuses on the transfer of practices and tensions in implementing both cooperative and coercive measures.

It shows that Rio de Janeiro's Pacifying Police Unit (UPP) included social development and police reform, and worked alongside NGOs to improve dialogue and mediation, partly to counter negative publicity around heavy-handed interventions. It drew on early operations as well as US examples. In Haiti, MINUSTAH moved from a military focus on winning territory, to a counterinsurgency strategy centred on information operations to gain trust and quick impact projects to win hearts and minds, and operations were handed over to police. It argues that Brazil's strategy has echoes of French counterinsurgency tactics in Algeria as well as US policing tactics, rather than being 'culturally Brazilian'. It highlights the 'interplay between the different strategies borrowed from across epochs and regions' (p. 504) and the difficulties of implementing new approaches within organisational subcultures.

Potential implications for policy:

- Highlights the difficulties balancing 'carrot and stick' approaches.
- Finds difficulties restricting the use of force in military police and peacekeeping units, because of their training and organisational culture.
- Changes in mission mandates may confuse the population, as well as being difficult to implement.
- Highlights the interplay of different approaches and state and non-state actors in shaping policy, and the use of military approaches alongside 'hearts and minds' ones.

Hoelscher and Norheim-Martinsen (2014)

Citation: Hoelscher, K. & Norheim-Martinsen, P.M. (2014). Urban violence and the militarisation of security: Brazilian 'peacekeeping' in Rio de Janeiro and Port-au-Prince, *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 25(5-6), 957-975.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2014.945636>

Authors: Kristian Hoelscher, Senior Researcher at Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) and Per M. Norheim-Martinsen, Vice Rector at Oslo Metropolitan University.

Methods/approaches: Analyses the link between Brazil's peacekeeping in Haiti and its urban security methods in Rio de Janeiro and discusses the implications for Brazil's strategy, based on interviews with police officers, fieldwork and policy documents.

Summary: The paper argues that Brazil's policing in Rio de Janeiro has been shaped by experiences of its forces in Haiti. Its policing is militarised, but also includes elements of community policing. The paper argues that in areas of Rio de Janeiro with high levels of violence, military approaches may be necessary to regain territorial control and make community engagement possible. However, the paper cautions that militarised approaches may be less suitable in contexts with lower levels of violence, and cautions that deeper structural reforms will also be needed.

Potential implications for policy:

- Militarised approaches may be needed to gain territorial control in particular ungoverned areas with high levels of violence, such as the favelas of Rio de Janeiro and areas of Port-au-Prince.
- The pacification of favelas in Rio de Janeiro does not represent a simple remilitarisation, as it has been influenced by counterinsurgency thinking and the need for community engagement. The paper highlights the potential value of linking military operations and community policing.
- Militarised approaches have reduced violence in Rio de Janeiro and Port-au-Prince in the short term.
- However, there is the potential for militarised approaches to spread from Rio de Janeiro to other places, with lower levels of violence, where they are likely to be less effective.
- Militarised approaches can damage democratic norms and institutions.
- Suggests that military approaches need to be matched with deeper reforms, otherwise their successes are unlikely to last.

Miranda et al. (2018)

Citation: Miranda, J., Tufro, M. & Litvachky, P. (2018). *The internal war: how the fight against drugs is militarizing Latin America*. Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales (CELS). <https://www.cels.org.ar/militarizacion/en.html>

Authors: CELS is an Argentinian human rights organisation.

Methods/approach: Provides an overview of trends in the militarisation of responses to drug crime across Latin America. It uses three indicators for militarisation: regulations on the role of the military in domestic matters; joint organisation between military and civilian entities; and military participation in anti-crime actions. It includes country-by-country data on US aid and training, arms sales, legal frameworks relating to the role of the military, evidence on human rights violations, and levels of violence. It also suggests causes and consequences of these trends.

Summary: The report argues that there is a trend towards militarisation in Latin America. It attributes this to reasons including: electoral incentives and social panic about drug crime; the conflation of trafficking and terrorism; the influence of the United States' 'war on drugs'; and local political cultures. It highlights negative consequences of these trends including the deprofessionalisation of the army; distraction from police reform; corruption of the military; erosion of democracy, including the use of the military to suppress social conflict; 'securitisation' as practices move from 'citizen security' to a focus on the protection of public order; greater secrecy in security forces; escalation and human rights violations. It argues that militarisation fails to solve the problems of drug crime, and serves to increase violence.

Potential implications for policy:

- Highlights the transnational trends in Latin America, shaped by US funding as well as local political cultures.
- Provides evidence of a number of negative effects of the ‘war on drugs’.

Stone (2019)

Citation: Stone, H. (2019). *Corruption and Plan Colombia: the missing link*. Transparency International Defence and Security (TI-DS). https://ti-defence.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/0619_DSP_Colombia_WEB.pdf

Authors: An international anti-corruption think tank.

Methods/approach: An analysis of US security assistance as part of Plan Colombia (2000-16) and corruption risks based on desk research and interviews with analysts and personnel.

Summary: Plan Colombia provided defence equipment and training to Colombian military forces. The report’s findings include that many of the forces equipped by Plan had links to organised crime. It also suggests that the military forces supported by Plan inflated their results, and in some cases killed civilians in order to claim them as ‘guerrillas’ or ‘civilians’ killed in combat to count towards targets. It attributes these failings to political pressure, insufficient senior staff during military expansion, and social cleansing.

Potential implications for policy:

- Provides evidence on some of the consequences of a policy focus on, and funding for, militarisation.

Sung et al (2022)

Citation: Sung, H., Capellan, J. & Barthuly, B. (2022). Trust in the police and the militarisation of law enforcement in Latin America. *Policing and Society*, 32(3), 311-340. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2022.2037551>

Authors: Hung-En Sung, Professor in Criminal Justice at John Jay College of Criminal Justice; Joel Capellan, Assistant Professor of Law and Justice Studies at Rowan University; and Bryce Barthuly, Lecturer at John Jay College of Criminal Justice.

Methods/approaches: The study uses survey data from 28,874 adults in 18 countries in the region to analyse respective levels of trust in the armed forces and police, and to trace the effects of militarisation on this trust.

Summary: The paper finds that when armed forces are deployed in the face of instability and criminal violence, public trust in the police falls. It also finds a higher

level of trust in the police than the army in Chile and Uruguay, possibly explained by higher levels of public order. By contrast, publics in Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic display much more trust in the army than police. Differences are explained by different levels of trust in the state.

Potential implications for policy:

- In many states in the region, there is a widespread public belief in the ability of the armed forces to protect the population from social breakdown.
- The police will struggle to regain public trust in many states in the region. They can choose to become more militarised, or to focus on evidence-based crime prevention.

Osorio (2015)

Citation: Osorio, J. (2015). The contagion of drug violence: spatiotemporal dynamics of the Mexican war on drugs. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 59(8), 1403-1432.

<https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002715587048>

Author: Javier Osorio, Assistant Professor in the School of Government and Public Policy at the University of Arizona.

Methods/approaches: The paper uses spatial econometrics to analyse the diffusion of violence in Mexico and show the effect of law enforcement approaches. It uses the Organized Criminal Violence Event Data (OCVED) database to show events of violence as well as instances and types of law enforcement tactic (violent enforcement, nonviolent tactics, drug interdiction, confiscation of criminal assets and seizure of weapons) in the period 2000-10.

Summary: The paper argues that law enforcement 'is an important catalyst for the intensification of violence between criminal organizations, especially when deployed in areas hosting a high concentration of criminal groups' (p. 1403). Law enforcement can trigger violence between criminal groups' competition over territory, and leads to a diffusion of violence to neighbouring areas. It finds that violent enforcement has a greater effect on levels of violence than nonviolent tactics.

Potential implications for policy:

- Supports the idea of contagion of violence, whereby suppression in one area, or of one criminal group, can increase competition among other groups.
- Shows that different types of law enforcement have different effects, with violent enforcement more likely to trigger violence.
- Provides a model for spatial analysis that can be applied to other contexts.

Felbab-Brown (2016)

Citation: Felbab-Brown, V. (2016). The Rise of Militias in Mexico: Citizens' Security or Further Conflict Escalation? *Prism*, 5(4), 172-187. <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-rise-of-militias-in-mexico-citizens-security-or-further-conflict-escalation/>

Author: Vanda Felbab-Brown, Brookings Institute.

Methods/approaches: Provides a narrative and discussion on increases in violence since 2006 focused on the role of citizen militias. It is based on the author's interviews in Michoacán, alongside news and think tank reports.

Summary: The paper discusses the effect of anti-drug cartel militias. Many develop spontaneously within communities, and some are supported by politicians or businessmen or women. They usually develop in areas where the state is absent. They are supported by the constitutional right of indigenous communities to form militias and government recruitment of militias.

The author asserts that there is an 'overwhelming tendency for the militias to go rogue' to the extent that they are a 'profound threat' to law and order (p. 174). They are often abusive and predatory or are co-opted by organised crime. In Guerrero and Michoacán, the La Familia crime organisation was weakened by government military action before being replaced by another group, calling itself a self-defence force, Los Caballeros Templarios. However, the latter also committed abuses, which triggered the formation of more anti-crime defence forces. The government has responded by cracking down on militias, then trying to absorb the groups into a Rural Defence Corps, but has struggled to achieve this.

Potential implications for policy:

- 'In Mexico, militias seemed to have the least proclivity toward abuse of local and rival communities when they emerged spontaneously from the local community, faced a particularly abusive external force in the form of outside criminal groups, and if major rifts and conflicts were absent from the community of the militia's origin' (pp. 183-184).
- However, there is evidence of widespread abuse and predation by militias, which has been difficult to restrain.
- Militias have been subject to co-option by drug cartels.
- Relates the militias to the absence of the state. The government has tried to regularise the militias, but has struggled to do so.

Granmaison (2016)

Citation: Grandmaison, R. L. C. (2016). "Vigilar y Limpiar": Identification and self-help justice-making in Michoacán, Mexico. *Politix*, 115(3), 103-125. <https://www.cairn-int.info/revue-politix-2016-3-page-103.htm>

Author: Romain Le Cour Grandmaison is a Senior Expert at the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.

Methods/approaches: The paper is based on ten months' fieldwork in Michoacán, Mexico, in the areas controlled by self-defence groups and includes data from interviews and informal conversations with locals and members of the self-defence groups. It analyses the groups' social composition and position, their vigilante techniques and their classification of the social order to understand their rise and fall.

Summary: The paper analyses a self-defence group in Michoacán, operating from 2013 to 2015. It was formed in response to the Knights Templar drug cartel, and was composed of local landowners and others able to mobilise local knowledge and networks, capital and links with government. The group sought to eradicate the Knights Templar drug cartel. The paper characterises the group's function as 'recreating a local order through the practices of investigation, vigilante justice, and classification of the social world' (p. 1). They emphasised their local status, defence of the people, family and local economic interests. They organised roadblocks, disarmed police, investigated state links with the cartels, seized cartel property and tracked and killed cartel members. They did not attack the drug trade but rather focused on stopping extortion, disappearances and violence. However, the groups themselves became increasingly linked to drug crime.

Potential implications for policy:

- The paper emphasises how the groups made crime 'legible' within local society in order to manage it. It highlights the importance of local networks of trust and the process of creating order and drawing legitimacy from local knowledge.
- The paper highlights the limitations of locally led vigilante groups. The groups did not seek the eradication of the drug trade, but instead focused on particular practices (extortion, violence, disappearance).

Wolff (2020)

Citation: Wolff, M. J. (2020). Insurgent vigilantism and drug war in Mexico. *Journal of Politics in Latin America*, 12(1), 32-52. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1866802X20915477>

Author: Michael J Wolff, Associate Professor of Political Science, Western Washington University.

Methods/approaches: The paper uses ethnographic research and interviews, in Michoacán, Mexico between June and August 2018, to understand the role and behaviour of vigilante groups. It seeks to understand how such groups overcome collective action problems. It situates itself in opposition to functionalist explanations and analyses the groups as social movements and considers the role of collective identities.

Summary: Vigilante groups have grown up in Mexico in recent decades to provide security, combat organised crime and the corruption of state institutions. The paper finds that identities and narratives are key factors in mobilising vigilante groups to face the significant risks brought by such action. Wolff notes the difficulties in classifying these groups, which may take on a crime-fighting role while also abusing their power. They are often co-opted by organised crime, may take on governing roles and also engage in protest. While noting their contribution to political fragmentation, the paper also highlights their potential for 'positive impact on democratic governance' as a check on corruption, and through the value of citizen participation (p. 48).

Potential implications for policy:

- Highlights the difficulties of characterising vigilante groups in a complex landscape and because of their varied functions.
- Points to the role of identities and narratives (alongside material benefits) in driving collective action in a highly dangerous situation.
- While noting findings that such groups become violent, the author also points to the value of citizen participation.

McDonald and Wilson (2017)

Citation: McDonald, M. & Wilson, L. (2017). Trouble in paradise: Contesting security in Bali. *Security Dialogue*, 48(3), 241-258. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010617692925>

Authors: Matt MacDonald, Associate Professor at the University of Queensland and Lee Wilson, Adjunct Senior Fellow at the University of Queensland.

Summary: The paper is based on ethnographical fieldwork with the paramilitary and security groups during 2011 and 2012. It focuses on the groups' relationship with the state and uses the lens of 'security contestation'. Seen through this lens, the groups 'advance particular visions of the values and scope of a particular political community (referent); the core threats to those values and that community (threats); the tools and

actions to achieve or advance security (means); and the actors responsible for advancing or protecting it (agents)' (p. 245).

The groups' positions rest on decentralisation in Indonesia and the continued legitimacy of 'customary' institutions and actors in Balinese society and Indonesian law. They act to protect 'Balinese culture' against threats such as immigrants, Western tourists and Islamic extremists. Acting as security agents, they have a considerable degree of legitimacy, based in part on their articulation of a particular community order.

The groups claim they work for their communities and are therefore distinct from private military companies. They are also distinct from insurgents or armed groups in ungoverned spaces, in that they are not seeking to challenge the state, and some have become members of government. However, they are challenging the state's monopoly on security through their legitimacy rooted in local culture, 'effectively relocating the practice of security to the customary realm and linking it to concerns with Balinese culture'. They are also involved in 'protectionism, extortion and even involvement in Bali's drugs trade' (p. 253).

Potential implications for policy:

- Highlights the overlapping 'array of state and non-state security actors' in Indonesia (p. 254).
- The paper addresses the broader question of how security actors gain legitimacy, and how conceptions of security are contested.
- It emphasises the role of culture and values in articulating claims to security enforcement and legitimacy.

Caveats to consider:

- The paper does not discuss the groups' methods or efficacy in combating SOC directly.

Health Poverty Action (2018)

Citation: Health Poverty Action. (2018). The development impacts of the 'war on drugs'. In Reitano, T., Jespersen, S., & Bird Ruiz-Benitez de Lugo, L. (Eds.), *Militarised responses to transnational organised crime: the war on crime* (pp. 299-322). Cham: Springer International Publishing. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-57565-0_17

Author: Health Policy Action, an international development charity.

Methods/approaches: Using the relatively small body of published literature on the subject, the chapter shows the effects of the 'war on drugs' on development in developing countries. It brings together published evidence from a number of contexts on different development indicators, to draw links between militarisation and development.

Summary: It argues that the war on drugs has been a 'disaster' for development. It finds that militarisation has led to increased violence, loss of access to services, loss of income to drug farmers, displacement by violence, reductions in government accountability, and has diverted resources from social programmes. It nevertheless cautions that there is still relatively little 'detailed context-specific evidence in many circumstances to specifically evaluate many of the development impacts of the militarisation of the "war on drugs", or indeed prohibition more widely' (p. 312).

Potential implications for policy:

- It calls for more indicators that include development effects, and a more holistic analysis of drug policy.
- The paper calls for drug policy reform towards more development-focused drug policy.

Johnson and Fernquest (2018)

Citation: Johnson, D. T. & Fernquest, F. (2018). Governing through killing: The war on drugs in the Philippines. *Asian Journal of Law and Society*, 5(2). 359-390.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/als.2018.12>

Authors: David T. Johnson, former diplomat and Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INL) and Jon Fernquest, PhD Student, University of Hawaii.

Methods/approaches: seeks to explain the use of extra-judicial killing under President Duterte in the Philippines since 2016. It situates the killings in the longer history of state judicial and extra-judicial killing, using criminological and political science literature.

Summary: The paper shows how policy has developed from a history of state violence and Duterte's methods in regional government. It explains the policy by: the problem of impunity in Philippine criminal justice, which has frustrated large segments of the public amid persistently high crime rates; a Philippine form of penal populism in which governing through killing remains popular even though it is ineffective as crime control; and a form of democratic underdevelopment that is perpetuated by a narrow elite who rule Philippine society for their own benefit.

Potential implications for policy:

- The role of public opinion in sustaining such policies against international pressure, as well as restraining them.
- The appeal of militarised approaches in the face of high crime rates.

Caveats to consider:

- The paper was published in 2018, only two years into Duterte's presidency.

Raffle (2021)

Citation: Raffle, E. (2021). The war on drugs in Southeast Asia as 'state vigilantism'. *International Journal of Drug Policy*, 92 (June 2021, 103114).
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.drugpo.2021.103114>

Methods/approaches: The paper seeks to characterise the 'war on drugs' in Philippines during the term of President Duterte, and in Thailand during the term of Thaksin Shinawatra. It outlines existing theories of state violence and looks at data on killings from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), the International Criminal Court (ICC) and other sources, and their patterns, tactics and targeting.

Summary: The paper uses the term 'state vigilantism' to characterise this state-led violence. It has five features: 'the intensity of violence, the dehumanisation of the target group, the involvement of the state apparatus in killings, the denial of involvement of the state and the vigilante form of the killings themselves' (p. 6). It finds that linguistic framing, securitised governance and histories of extrajudicial killing contributed to the policies. Police carried out the killing based on government incentives.

Potential implications for policy:

- Argues that the model can be applied to other contexts, such as Brazil and Nigeria.
- Highlights the direct negative consequences of these state-led militarised policies, with reference to data from a range of sources.

Caveats:

- Does not discuss the effect on SOC in depth.
- Focused on categorising the policy rather than its effects.